Management commissioned their regional office in Limburg to assess how flood management objectives could be achieved in future in the Dutch Meuse valley, assuming climate change will increase peak discharges. To ensure political support, regional discussion rounds were to help assess the measures previously identified. This paper discusses the ways in which hydrological and hydraulic expertise was input, understood and used in this assessment process. Project participants as a group had no trouble contesting assumptions and outcomes. Nevertheless, water expertise was generally accepted as providing facts, once basic choices such as starting situation had been discussed and agreed. The technical constraints determined that politically unacceptable measures would have to be selected to achieve the legally binding flood management objective.
INTRODUCTION
In the last millennium, water experts have played a large role in shaping the physique of The Netherlands. They contribute their technical knowledge, but they do not hesitate to get involved in the political debates on water management either. Of all water management issues, flood protection is the subject which, not surprisingly, attracts the most heated debates. Looking at their interventions in the national media, water experts' involvement has not guaranteed that they are always happy with the policy outcomes: they feel that their expertise is not (sufficiently) taken into account. Superficially it therefore looks as if water expertise is contested. If this is true, it can be understood at two levels. At a general level, the interventions made by water experts and the effect they achieve can be considered a normal part of the political process where different communities promote different ideas and values, or simply vie for political power. In this process powering often wins from puzzling (Flyvbjerg 1998; Hoppe in press) and economic interests often trump other concerns, so it is no surprise that water experts should feel that other parties are more influential. At a more detailed level, there have been some recent shifts in the policy-making arena in the doi: 10.2166/wst.2009.412 Netherlands that could give the impression of a relative decline of water experts' position as other disciplines came to the fore and got involved in what were traditionally water experts' domains. This started with the ecological turn in water management in the 1980s (Bijker 2002; Disco 2002; Lintsen 2002 ) followed some 15 years later by a spatial turn, with the introduction of a 'landscape quality' as objective . Conversely, the policy changes mentioned above can also be conceived as a new impulse to water experts, giving them a new platform to deliver their expertise.
This apparent contradiction between less influence and a new impulse is one example of what Nowotny has called the 'dilemma of expertise': 'Expertise has never before been so indispensable, while being simultaneously so hotly contested' (Nowotny 2003: 151 -152) . Whether it is the expertise itself that is contested or whether it is used as a means to argue over policy goals is the topic of this paper.
However, we will not examine the national policy-making processes and their outcomes. Rather, we will look at the regional scale where policies are implemented. We will show that water expertise is indispensable and decisive, though not uncontested, in the specific case of flood management. We show that it is the skill of the expert to make sure things get done; this also means sometimes doing work they might not find necessary or do work in a way they find sub-optimal. These are the constraints imposed by the politics of the policy-making process. But first we need to clarify a few terms which we have been using without explanation so far: experts and expertise.
EXPERTS AND EXPERTISE
In the introduction, we have used the term 'water experts' without specifying who these are and why we group them into one category. In this paper, water experts are professionals whose expertise is the design and/or construction of human interventions in rivers. They work for governmental organisations, commercial consulting or constructing firms, or in academia. They are mostly civil engineers, but also include related professions such as geographers and mathematicians. We are grouping these professionals under one heading because they form a community who use the same assumptions, theories and models. The substantive scope of water experts is more limited than that of 'river studies' distinguished by Van Hemert (2004) , as the latter include ecology.
According to the Oxford English Dictionary definition an expert is 'one who has gained skill from experience […]; one whose special knowledge or skill causes him to be regarded as an authority; a specialist'. In this definition it is clear that knowledge is not the only attribute experts have.
While knowledge is related to 'information acquired by study or research; ascertained truths, facts, or principles', expertise includes the skills needed to use knowledge in a specific context. According to Collins & Evans (2002) expertise involves the ability to translate to experts in different domains, and the ability to discriminate between knowledge claims judged from the socio-political context. For expertise to be useful in policy-making processes, the ability to translate to non-experts is at least as important as the ability to translate to other experts. In addition to the substantive expertise discussed by Collins & Evans (2002) , political expertise, i.e. dealing with power relations between relevant social groups, and procedural expertise, i.e. dealing with project planning and facilitation of meetings, are necessary for a decision-making process to be successful (Leeuwis & Van den Ban 2004: 180) . A degree of sensitivity to political and procedural issues is therefore useful for experts, making their expertise to be effective in a decisionmaking context. Employing the term 'expertise' instead of 'knowledge' has several advantages. First, it emphasises that knowledge is used in certain ways and that choices have to be made on how to use it: the use of knowledge is not neutral but ultimately depends on purpose and context and 'can never be reduced to the purely scientific and purely technical' (Nowotny 2003: 152) . Second, and related to the previous point, expertise is defined in a particular context which requires the interpretation of available knowledge as well as making informed guesses about the not available knowledge. 'When acting as experts, scientists do not respond to questions that they have chosen […] they are under instant and intense pressure to respond to a crisis in decisionmaking, when neither all necessary knowledge nor sufficient information is available, uncertainties abound and yet action must be taken' (Nowotny 2003: 152) . Third, there is no necessary association between conventionally certified scientific and technical experts and expertise: so-called lay people can also have expertise in the field of interest.
Collins and Evans show that the term 'lay expertise' is a contradiction in terms, for 'the dictionary definition of 'layman' includes the sentiment 'someone who is not an expert' (Collins & Evans 2002: 238) . Expertise, then, can reside with 'those who have not been recognised in the granting of certificates' (Collins & Evans 2002: 251) .
The question of whose expertise is to be recognised, translated and incorporated into action is a political one, and results in the above mentioned 'dilemma of expertise': the simultaneous contestation of and need for expertise.
We will now show how this dilemma was played out in the project 'Integrated Assessment of the River Meuse' (IVM).
THE MEUSE AND THE MODEL
The Meuse river originates in northern France, but its main catchment area is situated in the Ardennes massif in eastern Belgium. Its catchment area of approx. 33,500 km 2 includes parts of France, Luxemburg, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands (Table 1 and Figure 1 ). The Meuse is a rainfall river with floods occurring mainly in the winter months;
the average precipitation varies from 1,400 mm/year in the upper reaches to 750 mm/year in the lowlands. The spatial distribution patterns of rainfall in the Meuse basin clearly reflect the differences in altitude, which rises to 500 m a.s.l in the Ardennes (Pfister et al. 2004) . The mean discharge is approx. 221 m 3 /s at its mouth but due to its rapid reaction to precipitation there is a relatively large variability in both the mean annual and in the annual maximum discharge (Figure 2 ). The longest discharge record is available at Borgharen, where the Meuse enters the Netherlands:
discharge measurements started there in 1911 (Table 2 and Table 3 ).
Like most of the Netherlands, the natural floodplain of the downstream part of the Meuse river, stretch C in 
PLANNING FOR FUTURE FLOOD MANAGEMENT IN THE MEUSE
In the second half of the 1990s climate change predictions For the 1/250 per year discharge the same relative increase of 20% was assumed, increasing this discharge from 3,275
to 3,950 m 3 /s (Table 4) . The corresponding water level rise, for the current river channel geometry, would be 0. (Table 4) .
Implementing all 160 measures would reduce the water level well below the target horizontal line. In Figure 4 graph analyses. Some of the civil servants participating in the project group also attended these regional workshops, as well as operational staff of the Ministry of Transport, Public
Works and Water Management. Because of the considerable overlap between the workshops' participants and the project group members, the debates on water expertise in these gatherings were similar and influencing each other.
We will therefore refer to members of the project group and participants in the workshops as 'participants' when more specification is not needed.
Through the discussions in the project group and the working groups, civil servants working for local and regional administrations were kept informed of, and to some extent contributed to, experts' investigations. The potential solutions and the evaluation methods were mostly chosen by the experts involved in the project, but there was some degree of influence by local and regional civil servants. It was in this process of influencing substantive choices that water expertise was contested.
WATER EXPERTISE CONTESTED
The verification of water level targets was the water experts' core activity in IVM (Wesselink et al. 2006) . Essentially, a higher discharge in the future would cause water levels to rise. IVM's objective was to select engineering measures in the floodplain that would create space for the extra water 
ESTIMATE OF DESIGN DISCHARGE
The experts' estimate of the design discharge was chal- implemented. This made the task more acceptable.
By challenging the design discharge figures, the participants expressed first of all a general doubt about the need to prepare for increased discharges in future by reserving land for flood measures at present. As a municipal administrator said: 'They need to show with facts that it is really necessary before we will accept more engineering in our area'. However, the participants were prepared to suspend their general doubt and go along with the exercise set by IVM. Nevertheless, through the continuing challenges to the design discharge they tried to reduce the magnitude of the task, i.e. limit the number of measures they need to select. Altogether this seems to indicate that it would be very difficult to obtain cooperation for the implementation of flood protection measures to accommodate a design discharge that was not based on actual observations. This opinion was voiced literally by one project group member who reported that his organisation would block any proposal that was not based on observed discharges, saying that the effects of climate change were too unpredictable to warrant concrete measures in the present time. This opinion is in effect supported by the present law:
the design discharge is set for the foreseeable future so opponents would not find it difficult to challenge any concrete proposal based on estimates of future discharges in court.
We believe that the main reason why the participants went along with the assumed design discharge was the exploratory character of the study. As a civil servant said:
'This is not as serious as they like us to believe. In view of the political difficulties [...] a binding decision will not be taken.' The participants knew that many studies and consultations would be necessary before the diggers could move in, providing ample opportunity for opposition.
At the same time, they considered it important to ensure that the interests of the organisation they represented were taken into account even if this was a preliminary investigation. 'Everybody knows how these things go: it is a funnel, and before you know it, a solution has been defined' said a civil servant. Finally, the flexibility demonstrated by adding extra calculations, showing the effect of alternative measures suggested by participants, has certainly helped to suspend opposition as it sent the message that the project team was listening to the concerns that were voiced.
HYDRAULIC MODEL AND BLOKKENDOOS
The hydraulic model used in IVM to calculate water levels The project team did not want to take the Flemish plans into account, saying that Dutch politics had no influence on these so the worst case scenario had to be assumed.
This turned out to be a workable compromise, but it also caused confusion as ever more options were included and it was not always clear which one was being looked at.
Nevertheless, the Blokkendoos was generally accepted as providing usable information, once basic choices such as starting situation had been discussed and agreed. The participants challenged the SOBEK calculations more seriously in the next step of the project.
At the start of the project a total of 160 potential measures were identified on the 230 km stretch of the Dutch Meuse (Reuber et al. 2005) . When the feasibility of the proposed measures was assessed in the workshops, the participants considered many aspects in their evaluation:
economic, ecological, social, aesthetic, political, technical.
The selection procedure is analysed in Wesselink (2007) .
Many measures were rejected and many were reduced in size. After the workshops it appeared that most of the remaining measures were required to achieve the flood management target and very little choice was left.
The package which looked most likely to be acceptable was composed by the experts, and SOBEK calculations were run to verify whether this package would achieve the target water level. The result was a package which 
DISTRIBUTED EXPERTISE AND ITS DILEMMAS
It should be clear from the above description that project group members and workshop participants had to rapidly increase their own water expertise to be able to follow and participate in the discussions, if they did not already possess this expertise through training or professional experience. In fact, we have only explained the main topics here; many other technical terms were used and discussed that increased the need for participants to learn rapidly. With the expertise they already possessed or which they built up during the project, the participants as a group had no trouble contesting the assumptions implicit in the estimate of the design discharge.
They also quickly understood the basic principles of the Blokkendoos and could ask for substantial modifications to reflect their criticism. However, they did feel that it was difficult to translate the graphs into an effect on the ground and would have preferred to see flood impacts on maps.
Coming to grips with the hydraulic model proved to be the most challenging substantive aspect of IVM. where the challenger thinks that the quality of the water experts' work is not sufficient and should be improved for quality's sake. The early challenges to the use of SOBEK are in this category. It was common knowledge that the Maaswerken had been in serious trouble in the EIA-procedure because they had used a one-dimensional model and not a more accurate two-dimensional WAQUA model. Doubts had therefore been cast on the reliability of SOBEK so participants questioned its usability in general. However, the majority of the challenges were of the second type: arguments brought forward for political reasons. In these cases, the challenger does not agree with the assumptions or the outcomes of the calculations.
Instead of setting off into a political discussion where views are discussed explicitly, competing views are explored indirectly through substantive arguments.
We have discussed above how the design discharge was used to challenge the need for IVM as well as the need to set the target at such a high level. We estimate that all challenges to the design discharge figures were in the second category, as were the challenges to the options available in the Blokkendoos. The challenges to the outcomes of SOBEK in the final stages of the project also clearly belong to this category.
Although most challenges to water expertise were therefore politically motivated, it is difficult to see how the efforts to answer them substantively using water expertise could have been avoided. As long as the outcome of the computations was not clear, there was no need for those opposing temporary storage areas to enter into a head-on powering game. In the consensus -oriented culture of the Netherlands, puzzling with expertise is apparently preferable to powering by politicians. The final computations showed that temporary storage areas had to be prepared for, which was politically unacceptable: in the end water expertise was overruled by political interests.
CONCLUSION: WATER EXPERTISE AS CONTESTED ARBITRATOR
In the way the 'dilemma of expertise' (Nowotny 2003 
